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EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT: PATH 
DEPENDENCE AND THE BLESSING OF 
UNDERTHEORIZATION 
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ABSTRACT 
  Some commentators have lamented that the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) is undertheorized—that its purpose is unclear—and 
that its design is therefore suboptimal. This Note explores the credit’s 
path-dependent past, which has resulted in a present-day EITC that 
manifests a diverse, uncoordinated assortment of policy purposes. 
Although the EITC’s ambiguity of purpose may yield policy 
inefficiencies, this Note argues that it also produces significant 
political benefits that would-be reformers who value the EITC’s many 
societal benefits should take into account before they attempt to enact 
any major overhaul. 
INTRODUCTION 
Commentators have bemoaned that the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) is drastically undertheorized.1 Though this may sound 
unequivocally bad, this Note shows that the EITC’s 
undertheorization2 may actually be an advantage that policymakers 
should not abandon lightly. 
 
Copyright © 2016 Michael B. Adamson. 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2016; Brigham Young University, B.S. 
2011. Thank you to Professor Richard Schmalbeck for inspiring this Note’s topic and to my 
Duke Law Journal colleagues for guiding and motivating my many revisions. Thanks most of all 
to my wife, Lauren, and my daughter, Sloane, for their love, patience, and encouragement. 
 1. See infra Part I.B. 
 2. Professor Lawrence Zelenak uses the term “undertheorized” to describe how Congress 
has never explained the purpose of the EITC, “except in the vaguest and most general terms.” 
Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size Adjustment to 
the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 301 (2004). Because the purpose of the EITC is 
unclear, Professor Zelenak believes its design must be far from optimal. See id. (“Without a 
clear idea of what the EITC is supposed to do, it is impossible to determine how it should be 
designed.”). 
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With the EITC at a crossroads, this insight may have significant 
implications for its future. One reason to suspect policymakers may 
be primed to change the EITC is that the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and the current chairmen of the House Ways and 
Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance have all 
expressed a desire to enact tax reform in the 114th Congress,3 and 
leaders have expressed guarded optimism about tax reform’s 
likelihood.4 Even if tax reform—which brought with it a large EITC 
expansion in 19865—is unlikely due to the partisan divide between 
Congress and President Obama, the President and Speaker Paul 
Ryan have both recently proposed similar EITC expansions on which 
there may be room for bipartisan compromise.6 Furthermore, EITC 
advocates in Congress must act before 2018 to prevent a temporary 
EITC expansion from expiring.7 
 
 3. See Geoff Davis & James Carter, Ways and Means Chair’s Call to Action on Taxes, 
THE HILL (Dec. 2, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/economy-budget/
261707-ways-and-means-chairs-call-to-action-on-taxes [http://perma.cc/XL7D-2H3T] (detailing 
Kevin Brady’s strategic plan to “tee up pro-growth tax reform”); Brian Faler, Ryan’s Move 
Could Be Big Boost for Tax Reform, POLITICO (Nov. 2, 2015, 5:12 AM), http://www.
politico.com/story/2015/11/paul-ryan-tax-reform-house-speaker-215405 [http://perma.cc/9JRH-
LBKS] (describing Speaker Paul Ryan’s desire to expand the EITC as part of broader plans to 
enact comprehensive tax reform); Aaron E. Lorenzo, Hatch to Push Tax Rewrite as Incoming 
Chairman of Senate Finance Committee, BLOOMBERG BNA (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bna.
com/hatch-push-tax-n17179911052 [http://perma.cc/Y287-YCU2] (outlining Senator Orrin 
Hatch’s agenda for tax reform). 
 4. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Chance for Tax Overhaul is Seen in Shift of Power, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/07/us/politics/republican-wins-may-lead-
to-fiscal-deal-with-democrats.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/EF4A-UDYN] (reporting on a 
meeting between Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and President Barack Obama in 
which the two cite tax reform as potential common ground). But see, e.g., Scott A. Hodge, Do 
the Election Results Improve the Odds of Tax Reform?, TAX FOUNDATION (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://taxfoundation.org/blog/do-election-results-improve-odds-tax-reform [http://perma.cc/
7BHZ-3A9Q] (“[T]he likelihood that it will be this Congress and this president making [a deal 
on tax reform] seem[s] pretty remote.”). 
 5. See infra notes 203–20 and accompanying text. 
 6. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE 
PRESIDENT’S PROPOSAL TO EXPAND THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 5–7, 15–16 (2014), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/eitc_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/C7NC-YB
6E] (recommending an EITC expansion for childless workers, funding such expansion with 
additional tax revenue); PAUL RYAN, HOUSE BUDGET COMM. MAJORITY STAFF, EXPANDING 
OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA: A DISCUSSION DRAFT FROM THE HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE 
27–29 (2014), http://budget.house.gov/uploadedfiles/expanding_opportunity_in_america.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/D6TR-RQH2] (proposing to expand the EITC for childless workers, funding 
such expansion with cuts in welfare spending). 
 7. 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2012).  
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This Note first provides background information about the 
EITC, discusses the cause of its undertheorization, and then explains 
how such undertheorization may actually be a blessing, not a curse. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. The EITC 
The EITC has been a part of the tax code for more than forty 
years. Congress enacted it in 19758 as part of a tax-reduction package 
designed to address economic recession and high unemployment.9 
The original EITC had a maximum value of $400.10 Three years later, 
noting the EITC’s efficacy in “providing tax relief for low income 
families while at the same time providing work incentives for these 
individuals,”11 Congress expanded the credit and made it permanent.12 
Congress further expanded the EITC and indexed it for inflation as 
part of the Tax Reform Act of 198613 and expanded it in, among other 
years, 1990,14 1993,15 and 2001.16 
As a refundable credit, the EITC is somewhat unique among tax 
expenditures.17 Unlike most tax expenditures, which individually or 
collectively can do no more than reduce a taxpayer’s income-tax 
liability down to zero,18 the EITC is refundable, meaning eligible 
taxpayers enjoy the credit’s full value even if their precredit tax 
liability is already zero. In other words, it functions “as a kind of 
 
 8. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 9. H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 3 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-36, at 5 (1975). 
 10. Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204. In 2015 dollars, the maximum value of the credit was 
about $1765. CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [http://perma.cc/RAN2-6WNW]. 
 11. S. REP. NO. 95-1263, at 52 (1978). 
 12. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 103, 92 Stat. 2763, 2771 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 13. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 14. See infra notes 221–27 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 236–41 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 242–51 and accompanying text. 
 17. “The term ‘tax expenditures’ means those revenue losses attributable to provisions of 
the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross income 
or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of tax liability.” 2 
U.S.C. § 622(3) (2012). 
 18. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4152, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 1 (2013). 
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negative income tax.”19 As a simple illustration, consider a single 
taxpayer who earned $10,000 in 2015. This taxpayer would realize no 
value from a $100 deduction because her personal exemption20 and 
standard deduction21 leave her no taxable income. Similarly, she 
would not benefit from a $100 nonrefundable credit because she has 
no tax liability against which to apply the credit. In contrast, a $100 
refundable credit would be worth $100 to her because she could 
receive it in the form of a payment. 
The EITC’s refundability is an essential feature because the 
credit is designed to benefit low-income taxpayers22 whose income-tax 
liabilities tend to be low or nonexistent.23 The amount of the credit is 
based on a taxpayer’s “earned income,” which includes wages, 
salaries, and net earnings from self-employment, but does not include 
investment income such as capital gains and dividends.24 The credit’s 
value is calculated by multiplying the taxpayer’s earned income by the 
applicable credit percentage.25 Thus, as the taxpayer earns more, her 
credit increases until it reaches a maximum value.26 The credit then 
plateaus until the taxpayer reaches another earnings threshold, after 
which each additional dollar of earned income reduces a portion of 
the credit until it is completely phased out.27 Figures 1 and 228 
illustrate this process below. 
 
 
 19. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 791 
(3d ed. 2011). 
 20. The personal exemption reduces taxable income. For 2015, the personal exemption 
amount was $4000. Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 860, at 866. 
 21. The standard deduction reduces taxable income. For 2015, the standard deduction for 
unmarried individuals was $6300. Id. at 865. 
 22. See Earned Income Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/Credits-&-Deductions/
Individuals/Earned-Income-Tax-Credit [https://perma.cc/F97S-29F3] (“The Earned Income Tax 
Credit . . . is a benefit for working people with low to moderate income.”). 
 23. See ISAAC SHAPIRO & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET POLICY & PRIORITIES, 
INCOME TAX RATES AND HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS: HOW STRONG IS THE CASE FOR MAJOR 
RATE REDUCTIONS?, at ii (2001) (“Most low- and many moderate-income families . . . do not 
owe federal income taxes.”). 
 24. 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2) (2012). 
 25. Id. § 32(b). The credit percentage depends on the number of qualifying children the 
taxpayer has. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. The author created Figures 1 and 2 based on Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B. 863. 
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The EITC has grown from its humble beginnings29 to become the 
country’s “most significant federally administered anti-poverty 
 
 29. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2. 2015 EITC, Single, Surviving Spouse, Head of Household 
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program.”30 The EITC’s projected cost for fiscal year 2015 is $70.4 
billion.31 Its recorded cost in 2012, the most recent year for which the 
IRS has published data, was $64.1 billion.32 Of that amount, only $1.2 
billion went toward offsetting income-tax liabilities.33 Another $6.8 
billion was used to offset other taxes, including Social Security and 
Medicare taxes.34 The remaining $56.1 billion—accounting for nearly 
90 percent of the credit’s cost—was disbursed in the form of a 
government payment.35 In total, EITC-related outlays swamp the cost 
of other major federally administered antipoverty programs.36 Largely 
due to the enactment and growth of the EITC, the IRS has become 
“one of the government’s principal welfare agencies, on par with the 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Social 
Security Administration.”37 
B. The Undertheorized EITC 
Surprisingly, the EITC is “severely undertheorized”38 considering 
its age and scope. Professor Lawrence Zelenak laments that Congress 
has never explained the EITC’s purpose “except in the vaguest and 
most general terms,”39 and a number of scholars echo this sentiment.40 
 
 30. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 793. 
 31. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014–2018, at 32 (Comm. Print 2014). 
 32. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. STATISTICS OF INCOME, RETURNS WITH EARNED INCOME 
CREDIT, BY SIZE OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME, TAX YEAR 2012 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/
file_source/pub/irs-soi/12in25ic.xls [http://perma.cc/T6UG-2LCS]. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. For example, the 2014 cost of the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program was $16.5 billion. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO TANF 2 (June 15, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/
files/7-22-10tanf2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A6DW-39MC]. Medicaid and the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp program) cost more but are 
administered at the state level. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2014 
ACTUARIAL REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR MEDICAID, at i (2014) (reporting 
Medicaid outlays in 2013 of $457.8 billion); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION 
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM NATIONAL VIEW SUMMARY 1 (2016), http://www.fns.usda.gov/sites/
default/files/pd/34SNAPmonthly.pdf [http://perma.cc/2TBJ-HF4P] (Showing that SNAP outlays 
for FY 2014 and FY 2015 were each just short of $70 billion); John L. Czajka, Can 
Administrative Records Be Used to Reduce Nonresponse Bias?, 645 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 171, 175 n.1 (2013) (noting that SNAP and Medicaid are administered by the states). 
 37. Kristen E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1730 
(2014). 
 38. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301. 
 39. Id.  
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So how can it be that the EITC’s purpose remains fuzzy after forty 
years of legislative history? In this Note, I do not attempt to divine a 
singular, unified purpose undergirding the EITC. Instead, I explain 
why the EITC lacks “any coherent purpose discernible from [its] 
structure.”41 Specifically, I examine the role path dependence has 
played in fueling the EITC’s advancement. By analyzing the EITC’s 
path-dependent past, I uncover a surprising insight that policymakers 
should take into account when considering the EITC’s future. 
II.  PATH DEPENDENCE 
This Part introduces the concept of path dependence, explains 
how it works in the economy and in policymaking, and describes its 
value as a theoretical lens. 
A. Path Dependence in Economics  
The concept of path dependence is that “each step in one 
direction makes additional steps in that same direction more likely.”42 
One of the primary mechanisms driving this tendency of directional 
inertia is “increasing returns.”43 In the economy, increasing returns 
arise as a result of four conditions: “large . . . fixed costs . . . ;44 
learning effects, which lower costs as a product becomes more 
common; coordination effects, which confer benefits for taking action 
similar to others; and . . . adaptive expectations, which lead actors to 
 
 40. E.g., CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES 
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 64 (1999); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of 
Redistribution? An Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 258, 284 
(2009); John J. Infranca, Note, The Earned Income Tax Credit as an Incentive to Report: 
Engaging the Informal Economy Through Tax Policy, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 203, 218 n.87 (2008). 
 41. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301. 
 42. Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal 
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 613 (2001). 
 43. Id. at 608. 
 44. A firm’s costs can be categorized as either fixed or marginal. KENNETH S. CORTS & 
JAN W. RIVKIN, A NOTE ON MICROECONOMICS FOR STRATEGISTS 6 (2000). Fixed costs are 
expenses that a firm must pay to carry on its business, regardless of the firm’s output. Id. For 
example, building rent is a fixed cost because it costs the same no matter how many units a firm 
produces. Id. Marginal costs, on the other hand—for example, raw materials and direct labor 
costs—are directly proportional to production levels. Id. In any production process, as output 
increases, the fixed costs per unit decrease. Id. at 7. Thus, a firm’s overall cost per unit—that is, 
its combined fixed and marginal costs per unit—will decline as output increases (at least until 
the firm approaches its maximum production capacity). Id. 
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react to current conditions in ways that enhance the likelihood that 
similar conditions will persist . . . .”45 
Path dependence is perhaps best illustrated through a historical 
example: the QWERTY keyboard, which Christopher Latham Sholes 
patented in 1868.46 Some historians claim that Sholes arranged 
QWERTY’s keys to resolve mechanical failures that plagued early 
typewriter prototypes.47 Others argue that he intentionally designed 
QWERTY to be nonintuitive in order to support a marketing scheme 
in which typewriter manufacturer Remington could sell typing 
courses to typewriter purchasers.48 Still others suggest Sholes intended 
QWERTY to be responsive to the morse-code-translation needs of 
telegraph operators.49 Of course, none of these design purposes 
remain relevant in the twenty-first century. Yet, the QWERTY 
keyboard is still the standard keyboard arrangement for computers, 
tablets, and phones in English-speaking countries.50 Path dependency 
best explains its longevity. 
Each of the four increasing-returns conditions mentioned above 
contributed to the QWERTY keyboard’s rise and sustained 
dominance. First, Sholes incurred significant fixed start-up costs in 
successfully bringing his invention to market; specifically, he devoted 
ten years to research and development.51 Second, and perhaps most 
significantly, once a critical mass of people learned how to type on the 
QWERTY keyboard, other keyboard alternatives—which would 
have compelled typists to undergo expensive retraining—became less 
viable.52 This learning effect has been so acute and self-perpetuating 
with QWERTY that the keyboard arrangement is still used today, 
even on thumb-only devices like phones for which ten-digit 
QWERTY training is only marginally beneficial. Third, within fifteen 
years of QWERTY’s debut, the five largest typewriter manufacturers 
 
 45. Hathaway, supra note 42, at 609. 
 46. Jimmy Stamp, Fact of Fiction? The Legend of the QWERTY Keyboard, SMITHSONIAN 
(May 3, 2013), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/fact-of-fiction-the-legend-of-the-
qwerty-keyboard-49863249/?no-ist [http://perma.cc/YJY4-9GUS]. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. (“The fate of the keyboard was decided in 1893 when the five largest typewriter 
manufacturers . . . agreed to adopt QWERTY as the de facto standard that we know and love 
today.”). 
 51. See id. (discussing the history of Sholes’s typewriter inventions and the evolution of the 
keyboard). 
 52. Id. 
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converged on QWERTY as the standard typewriter system, thereby 
sharing, through coordination, in a larger, unified customer base.53 
Finally, both consumers and manufacturers responded to the initial 
ascendancy of QWERTY so as to generate a feedback loop that has 
not yet stopped churning: consumers bought QWERTY expecting it 
to remain the market-leading technology and to be the arrangement 
least likely to become obsolete and necessitate retraining; 
manufacturers embraced QWERTY presumably because its customer 
base was the largest and most likely to grow.54 
One of path dependence’s key insights is that increasing-returns 
markets’ ultimate shape depends heavily on early events, which often 
display a significant random element.55 In Professor Paul A. David’s 
words, “[I]t is sometimes not possible to uncover the logic (or illogic) 
of the world around us except by understanding how it got that 
way.”56 In highlighting the role of randomness, path dependence 
yields an important insight about market efficiency: as with a winding 
fur trapper’s path that evolves first into a dirt road and then into a 
rambling highway, current market institutions often fall short of 
optimal efficiency. When institutions and individuals fail to critically 
evaluate the increasing returns–driven directional inertia that propels 
market evolution, they risk forgoing alternative and more efficient 
paths—leaving them doomed to meander when blazing a straight trail 
would be better.57 
B. Legal Path Dependence 
The increasing-returns environment that precipitates path 
dependence is at least as prevalent in the development of statutes as it 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. (observing that “the fate of the keyboard was decided,” and the QWERTY’s 
dominance cemented, when the QWERTY technology became the clear market leader). 
 55. Hathaway, supra note 42, at 610. 
 56. Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332, 332 
(1985). 
 57. Firms in the economy—even leading ones best equipped to innovate—that fail to 
recognize and analyze the role of path dependence in market and product evolution may 
consequently miss opportunities to develop “disruptive innovations”—that is, revolutionary new 
technologies that service previously unidentified or underdeveloped markets. See generally 
CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997) (describing how businesses lose market leadership 
because of managers’ failure to abandon traditional business practices and to develop 
“disruptive innovation”). 
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is in that of products and markets.58 This Section details three factors 
that help cultivate an increasing-returns environment in the U.S. 
legislative process: collective action, policymakers’ short-term 
orientation, and status quo bias.59 This Section then explains the value 
of analyzing the role of path dependence in policy development. 
1. Factors that Contribute to an Increasing-Returns Environment 
in the U.S. Legislative Process.  A collective-action problem emerges 
when groups attempt to produce “public goods”—that is, goods that 
are nonrivalrous (consumption by one does not prevent consumption 
by others) and nonexcludable (all group members can freely consume 
whether or not they contributed to production).60 Because all group 
members obtain the same benefit from a public good, regardless of 
whether they bear its production costs, they have an incentive to free 
ride on the production costs of others.61 With all group members 
incentivized to free ride rather than produce public goods, groups 
tend not to produce such goods at socially optimal levels.62 
Collective action helps facilitate path dependence in the U.S. 
legislative process. In the legislative context, “laws themselves have 
the character of public goods for those who benefit from them.”63 For 
example, legislators can obtain political benefits from the enactment 
of popular legislation simply by voting for it, even if they otherwise 
contribute nothing to its enactment. Moreover, the collective-action 
problem inherent in the legislative process is particularly severe 
because, unlike in economic markets in which individuals may be able 
to innovate independently, no single individual can create a law by 
herself;64 rather, all legislative participants must depend on others’ 
 
 58. See Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (“[I]ncreasing return arguments are at least as relevant to an 
understanding of politics as they are in other areas of the social sciences.”). 
 59. Id. at 257–58, 261–62. 
 60. David E. Bernstein & Ilya Somin, Judicial Power and Civil Rights Reconsidered, 114 
YALE L.J. 591, 603 (2004). A paradigmatic example of a public good is a lighthouse: one sailor’s 
using a lighthouse to navigate does not prevent other sailors from doing the same, and within-
sight-range sailors cannot be excluded from consuming lighthouse-emitted light. For a more in-
depth explanation of public goods, see generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND 
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC GOODS (1968). 
 61. Bernstein & Somin, supra note 60, at 603. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Pierson, supra note 58, at 258. 
 64. President Barack Obama is one possible exception. Cf. Saturday Night Live (NBC 
television broadcast Nov. 22, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JUDSeb2zHQ0 
ADAMSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2016  12:22 PM 
2016] THE EITC’S UNDERTHEORIZATION 1449 
actions—for example, their lobbying or campaigning efforts—to 
achieve legislative objectives.65 As a result, in order to effect 
significant policy change, a relatively large number of legislators must 
simultaneously overcome the temptation to free ride.66 A policy, once 
enacted, thus has a strong tendency to persist.67 
Policymakers’ short-term orientation also plays a considerable 
role in facilitating legal path dependence. Policymakers tend to ignore 
long-term consequences.68 One of the primary reasons for this is that 
an election-minded president or member of Congress is far more 
likely to care about current problems than those that arise after her 
retirement.69 Resisting path dependence and implementing beneficial 
innovations, however, often require a lengthened time horizon.70 In 
the marketplace, a firm may be willing to invest in a revolutionary 
technology—thereby overcoming path-dependence inertia—despite 
short-term losses if it expects to realize offsetting long-term benefits.71 
In contrast, short term–focused policymakers tend to discount or 
ignore long-term outcomes and are therefore less likely to incur any 
short-term political costs72 necessary to forge an innovative policy 
path.73 
Finally, the legislative process often results in path dependence 
because political institutions tend to be harder to change than 
economic institutions.74 This status quo bias results from two different 
 
[http:// perma.cc/38H9-JMRL] (spoofing President Obama’s unilateral policy response to 
legislative gridlock over immigration policy). 
 65. Pierson, supra note 58, at 258. 
 66. See id. (“Whether you put energy into . . . join[ing] a potential coalition . . . may depend 
to a considerable degree on your confidence that a large number of people will do the same.”). 
 67. See id. at 258–59 (“[D]espite massive social, economic, and political changes over time, 
self-reinforcing dynamics associated with collective action processes mean that organizations 
have a strong tendency to persist once they are institutionalized.”). 
 68. Richard Rose, Inheritance Before Choice in Public Policy, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 263, 
286 (1990). 
 69. Id. As an illustrative anecdote, one of President Ronald Reagan’s senior advisers 
responded to a bureaucrat’s concerns about the future viability of Social Security by quipping, 
“We weren’t elected to solve the problems of 2010.” Id. 
 70. Pierson, supra note 58, at 261. 
 71. Id. at 261–62. 
 72. Such short-term costs may include efforts associated with lobbying colleagues, 
pushback from special interest groups, and short-term voter dissatisfaction during their change-
adjustment period. 
 73. Id. at 262. 
 74. Id. 
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phenomena.75 First, policy architects often design legislation to be 
difficult to change in order to prevent “their” policies from being 
overturned or co-opted by opponents.76 Second, political actors often 
attempt to bind themselves and—especially in the case of presidents 
and members of their parties—to support a policy in the future by 
expressing support for it in the present.77 
2. The Implications of Legal Path Dependence.  Analyzing the 
role of path dependence in policy development yields three benefits. 
In a world of purposive actors and the invisible hand,78 the assumption 
that policies exist because they serve some especially valuable 
purpose is tempting.79 But scouring legislative history for evidence of 
path dependence can (1) expose policies premised on obsolete 
purposes or random historical events,80 (2) prompt voters and 
policymakers to contemplate radical policy innovation,81 and (3) fill 
theoretical gaps.82 These benefits were manifest in a recent article by 
Professor Steven L. Schwarcz that applied path-dependence analysis 
to the special rights and immunities that the bankruptcy process gives 
derivatives counterparties.83 Professor Schwarcz’s analysis both 
revealed that and explained why such rights and immunities fail to 
fulfill their stated purpose.84 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. This type of commitment is effective because politicians are often criticized for 
changing their minds about policies. See, e.g., John Kerry, Flip-flopper?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 
2004, at 36 (describing the potency of President George W. Bush’s flip-flopping assertions 
against Secretary John Kerry, who was a Senator and presidential candidate at that time).  
 78. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 453, 456 (6th ed., George Bell & Sons 1887): 
[T]he study of [an individual’s] own advantage naturally, or rather necessarily leads 
him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society. . . . [H]e 
intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible 
hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
(emphasis added). 
 79. See Pierson, supra note 58, at 264 (“Arguments about increasing returns, however, 
suggest the large dangers in any assumption that an institution arose because it serves some 
particularly useful purpose.”). 
 80. See supra notes 46–50, 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 57. 
 82. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 83. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and 
Systemic Risk, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 699 (examining whether U.S. bankruptcy law’s treatment of 
creditors’ rights and immunities in derivatives transactions could be adapted to minimize 
systemic risk). 
 84. Id. 
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III.  EVOLUTION OF THE EITC 
A focus on increasing returns justifies a turn to history. 
  – Professor Paul Pierson85 
This Part delves into the EITC’s legislative history to set up the 
path-dependence analysis undertaken in Part IV. It traces the EITC’s 
history from its predecessor proposals to its enactment and 
subsequent expansions. 
A. Predecessor Proposals 
The EITC was preceded by at least three ancestral proposals 
made by economist Milton Friedman and Presidents Richard Nixon 
and Gerald Ford. 
1. Milton Friedman’s NIT.  Economist Milton Friedman has been 
called the “father of the negative income tax.”86 He first developed 
the idea for a negative income tax (NIT) while at the Treasury 
Department.87 In the beginning, Friedman saw the NIT as a solution 
to fairness problems caused by graduated tax rates and fluctuating 
incomes.88 He later came to recognize the NIT’s potential as a 
mechanism for alleviating poverty.89 
Friedman liked the idea of administering an antipoverty measure 
through the tax code for several reasons.90 First, Friedman saw the tax 
code as an especially effective platform for alleviating poverty 
because it allowed the government to premise assistance purely on 
 
 85. Pierson, supra note 58, at 263. 
 86. VINCENT J. BURKE & VEE BURKE, NIXON’S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM 169 
(1974). 
 87. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME 50 (1973). 
 88. Id. Because taxpayers generally pay higher marginal income-tax rates as their incomes 
rise, taxpayers with fluctuating incomes tend to pay more taxes over time than taxpayers with 
equivalent but steady incomes. See SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 141 (providing 
an illustration). This effect was particularly acute among low-income workers because income 
fluctuations moved them back and forth between a zero tax bracket and a positive one. 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50. Friedman proposed an NIT as a way of evening out net tax 
liabilities among similar earners over time—workers would pay taxes in good years and would 
receive payments from the Treasury Department in bad ones. Id. 
 89. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50. Professor Lawrence Zelenak points out that, though 
Friedman did not explicitly describe it as such, his NIT is basically a guaranteed annual income. 
Zelenak, supra note 2, at 303. 
 90. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191–93 (1962). 
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the basis of a taxpayer’s low income,91 rather than on less relevant 
factors like the recipient’s age or career.92 The NIT was also desirable 
because it provided benefits in the form most useful to the recipient: 
cash.93 Friedman viewed the NIT as a less-distortionary means of 
raising incomes than the minimum wage, and he intended for his NIT 
to replace the government’s “rag bag” of welfare programs as a 
means of reducing administrative costs associated with antipoverty.94 
In addition, Friedman noted that a single consolidated antipoverty 
measure would enable the public to better understand the cost and 
evaluate the efficacy of the government’s antipoverty efforts.95 
Finally, Friedman liked that, unlike traditional welfare programs that 
imposed 100 percent marginal tax rates on earnings,96 his NIT 
proposal would preserve work incentives by imposing marginal tax 
rates of 50 percent or less.97 
2. From Johnson’s Self-Help to Nixon’s Family Assistance Plan.  
President Lyndon Johnson famously declared war on poverty in 
1964.98 His proposals focused on “self-help” measures designed to 
provide education, training, and work opportunities rather than 
income support.99 Despite the Johnson administration’s efforts to 
reduce dependence on welfare, welfare rolls grew steadily during the 
1960s,100 leading some to ridicule Johnson’s war as “little more than a 
 
 91. Premising the NIT purely on low income is different from the modern-day EITC, which 
requires work effort. 
 92. Id. at 191–92. 
 93. Id. at 192. 
 94. Id. at 191–93. 
 95. See id. at 192 (“[The NIT] makes explicit the cost borne by society.”).  
 96. For example, at that time, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program “operated on the principle that earnings of a welfare recipient would be deducted, 
dollar-for-dollar, from welfare payments.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 50. 
 97. Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics: The Political History of 
the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT 
AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES 15, 18 (Bruce D. Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 
2001). 
 98. See Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3382 [http://perma.cc/3SU6-GDBK] (“This 
administration today, here and now, declares unconditional war on poverty in America.”). 
 99. Ventry, supra note 97, at 18–19. 
 100. Between 1960 and 1970, the number of Americans receiving welfare surged from 3.1 
million to 9.0 million. Id. at 19. Ironically, President Johnson rejected an NIT because, in his 
eyes, the proposal did not provide an adequate work incentive. Id. at 18. 
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modestly financed skirmish.”101 Johnson’s social reforms “had been 
oversold, and . . . underfinanced to the degree that seeming failure 
could be ascribed almost to intent.”102 
President Nixon thus inherited a welfare “crisis”103 and turned to 
a version of Friedman’s NIT as a solution. Social-welfare reform was 
uncharted territory for Republicans whose participation in that realm 
had traditionally consisted of opposing Democratic proposals.104 
Nixon in particular strongly opposed welfare.105 By the time he took 
office, however, the problem of welfare dependency was severe, 
visible, and intertwined with seething issues of poverty and racial 
inequality;106 Nixon felt compelled to respond.107 Rather than 
addressing the problem timidly and incrementally, Nixon saw an 
opportunity to exalt his legacy108 and accordingly wanted first and 
foremost for his reform proposal to be bold and creative.109 But 
developing an ambitious and innovative proposal that might broaden 
the party’s base of support among moderates and liberals while not 
alienating conservatives110 proved difficult because the vast majority 
of social scientists on whom Nixon might rely for expert advice were 
politically liberal.111 The NIT ultimately gained traction because it 
 
 101. STANLEY ESTERLY & GLENN ESTERLY, FREEDOM FROM DEPENDENCE: WELFARE 
REFORM AS A SOLUTION TO POVERTY 26 (1971); see also MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 55 (“A 
good deal of money was being expended. It could not be shown that it was going to the poor. It 
was going, in large degree, to purchase services which could not be shown to benefit the poor.”). 
 102. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 66. 
 103. Id. at 59. 
 104. Id. at 64–65. 
 105. See id. at 86 (describing how Nixon’s “Puritan ethic” spurred his aversion toward 
welfare); see also id. at 98 (noting that “[Nixon] was not neutral about welfare; he was against 
it”). 
 106. The destruction of the poor, especially the black poor, by the existing welfare system 
was “the most serious social problem of the time.” Id. at 214. 
 107. See id. at 68–69 (“Nixon was fated to deal with welfare” because, by the time he took 
office, welfare dependency “was making its way to the center of national politics” and had 
become “a condition about which something had to be done.”).  
 108. See id. at 74 (observing that Nixon’s awareness of his reputation in American history 
played a role in his adopting an aggressive approach to welfare reform). 
 109. See id. at 74, 97 (describing Nixon’s desire to be both bold and innovative with respect 
to welfare reform). 
 110. Sixty-eight percent of the population at the time described itself as either moderate or 
conservative. Id. at 70. 
 111. See id. at 70, 96 (describing how Nixon enlisted advisers from the predominately liberal 
ranks of social science, the inclination of whom was to “search for ways to provide more welfare 
rather than less”). But see Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., From FDR to W: The IRS as Financial 
Intermediary, 29 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2002) (pointing out that the team of advisers who 
oversaw Nixon’s welfare reform efforts also included Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Cheney). 
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satisfied Nixon’s aspirations of boldness and innovation112 while also 
obscuring—with its conservative origin113—the proposal’s 
progressivity.114 
The NIT became the central tenet of Nixon’s landmark 1969 
welfare-reform proposal, the Family Assistance Plan (FAP). Before 
proposing an NIT, Nixon had already ushered through Congress a 
“low income allowance”115 that removed two million low-income 
families from the federal income-tax rolls.116 Nixon’s NIT was 
designed to provide further assistance in the form of an income floor 
administered through the tax code.117 Subject to a “work 
requirement,”118 families would receive a maximum benefit119 
corresponding with an earned income of zero up to a phaseout 
threshold.120 Beyond that threshold, the maximum benefit would be 
 
 112. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 143 (“The alternatives open to the president were to 
advocate some incremental changes in the existing system, or take the giant step to [the NIT]. 
He chose the latter.”). 
 113. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 114. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 127 (noting the NIT’s potential for obscuring a 
guaranteed-income proposal); see also id. at 65 (describing how one liberal commentator, upon 
learning about Friedman’s NIT, exclaimed, “[T]his conservative has provided us with a way to 
get guaranteed income”). 
 115. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 802, 83 Stat. 487, 676 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 116. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 114–15. Eliminating low-income families from the tax 
rolls received little attention, but may have been “the most important development to that date 
of the War on Poverty.” Id. at 115. 
 117. See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET (1969), reprinted in 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 229, 235 [hereinafter WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET] 
(presenting a sample NIT benefit schedule). 
 118. Id. at 231. The work requirement attached to the FAP stipulated that all 
“[e]mployable” recipients would sacrifice their portion of NIT benefits if they refused to accept 
either training or employment. Id. In other words, if an employable parent refused to work, his 
or her family’s NIT benefit would be reduced by $300 in the bill sent to Congress, an amount 
which was raised to $500 by the Committee on Ways and Means, but not eliminated entirely. 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 220. Thus, the “work requirement” was really more of a work 
incentive, a moderate penalty for refusing to work. Id.  
 119. The maximum benefit varied depending on family size: $500 per person for the first two 
family members and $300 per person for each additional family member. WELFARE REFORM 
FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 230. Thus, a family of eight would have qualified for a 
maximum benefit of $2800. Id. At $1600 for a family of four, Nixon’s NIT provided a benefit (in 
inflation-adjusted dollars) more than four times larger than the maximum benefit provided by 
the EITC when it was first enacted and more than 50 percent larger than the maximum benefit 
provided to a family of four by the current EITC. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; 
supra Figures 1–2. Figure 4 below compares the EITC to Nixon’s NIT in terms of current 
dollars. 
 120. WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 235. 
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phased out at a rate of 50 percent for each dollar of additional 
income.121 Figures 3 and 4122 below illustrate the impact of these 
programs. 
Figure 3. Nixon NIT Benefit Schedule, Family of Four 
Figure 4. Comparison of Benefit Provided Under Nixon’s NIT and 
2015 EITC for a Family of Four 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 121. Id. A 50 percent phaseout rate is much higher than the applicable rate under the 
current EITC, which ranges from 7.65 percent to 21.06 percent, see supra Figures 1–2, but it was 
a significant improvement over the AFDC, which imposed a 100 percent phaseout rate, see 
supra note 96. 
 122. The author created Figures 3 and 4 based on information contained in WELFARE 
REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 235.  
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Although conservative economist Milton Friedman had come up 
with the idea for the NIT,123 Nixon’s implementation was far from 
politically conservative, a fact he tried to conceal. A negative income 
tax is inherently neither conservative nor liberal; rather, it is a tool 
that can be presented as consistent with either side’s preferred policy 
objectives.124 In the case of Nixon’s FAP, the NIT provided a 
guaranteed minimum income, “an idea of the left.”125 In fact, the 
FAP’s large-scale126 guaranteed-income provision made the proposal 
arguably “the most progressive welfare reform theretofore proposed 
by an American president.”127 Fearing rejection by conservatives and 
by the public,128 Nixon endeavored to make the FAP seem more 
conservative than it was.129 In a speech about the proposal, Nixon 
denied that it implemented a guaranteed income,130 characterized the 
plan’s modest work incentive131 as a “work requirement,”132 and 
generally used rhetoric that would appeal to conservatives.133 At least 
some listeners immediately saw through the façade: shortly after 
Nixon’s speech, James Reston, a New York Times columnist, 
remarked that the President had “cloaked a remarkably progressive 
welfare policy in conservative language.”134 
 
 123. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 124. For example, conservatives, like Milton Friedman, might use the NIT to replace 
welfare, whereas progressives may use it to redistribute income. 
 125. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 127 (“The original proponents of a guaranteed 
income tended to be apocalyptic about capitalism and more or less disdainful of bourgeois 
virtue.”). 
 126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 127. William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 
1431, 1501 (1986); see also BURKE & BURKE, supra note 86, at 127 (noting the observation in the 
press that Nixon’s FAP was “more radical than virtually anything done by the Johnson 
administration”). Interestingly, Robert F. Kennedy rejected the idea of a guaranteed income 
during his 1968 presidential campaign as a proposal to “pay men to sit at home.” MOYNIHAN, 
supra note 87, at 61–62. 
 128. In a 1968 Gallup Poll, 58 percent of those surveyed opposed guaranteed income 
because they perceived it as undermining the incentive to work—“nobody should get something 
for nothing.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 245. 
 129. One of Nixon’s speechwriters stressed that the primary purpose of Nixon’s speech 
about the FAP was “to make a radical proposal seem conservative.” Id. at 218. 
 130. Richard Nixon, President of the U.S., Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs 
(Aug. 8, 1969), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2191 [http://perma.cc/6N4B-KV3Q]. 
 131. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 132. Nixon, supra note 130. 
 133. See, e.g., id. (“What America needs now is not more welfare, but more ‘workfare.’”). 
 134. James Reston, President Nixon, Poverty and Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1969, at E10. 
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Nixon’s efforts to control the message surrounding the FAP did 
not quell resistance from either liberal or conservative forces. An 
optimistic Nixon hoped conservatives would accept at face value his 
conservative portrayal of the FAP while liberals would look past his 
words and regard the proposal’s progressive substance.135 To some 
extent, just the opposite happened. Liberal activists136 opposed 
Nixon’s FAP because they (1) believed his assertion that it was not 
really a guaranteed income,137 (2) feared that the NIT was a pretext 
for unraveling existing antipoverty measures,138 (3) felt that, even if 
the NIT was a guaranteed income, it was insufficient,139 (4) simply 
distrusted140 and disliked141 President Nixon, and (5) did not want to 
see the President achieve a victory on “their” social-reform 
territory.142 Some conservatives143 on the other hand denounced the 
FAP as a redistributive144 attack on self-reliance,145 emphasizing their 
 
 135. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 216–17. 
 136. Liberal opposition forces included the National Welfare Rights Organization 
(NWRO), the Congressional Black Caucus, the California CAP Directors Association, the 
National Association of Social Workers, the American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, and the National Urban League. Id. at 226, 249, 311, 318, 325, 339–40. 
Notably, the AFL-CIO did not actively oppose the FAP, treating the proposal instead with 
“tolerant ambivalence.” Id. at 276, 285. 
 137. Id. at 127. 
 138. Id. Though Nixon’s FAP would have, in large part, displaced the AFDC, welfare 
recipients would have received at least the same level of benefits and in many cases greater 
benefits. WELFARE REFORM FACT SHEET, supra note 117, at 229, 231. In particular, the 
Southern states, where state-administered AFDC benefits were notoriously sparse, would have 
seen an increase in benefits. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 163. 
 139. The NWRO, for example, wanted to raise the minimum guaranteed income from $1600 
to $5500 for a family of four. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 247. Today, a $5500 guaranteed 
income would equal $35,568. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 10. Such a proposal 
would have required providing benefits to over half of the U.S. population and would have cost 
about $415 billion a year in inflation-adjusted dollars. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 247.  
 140. Distrust for President Nixon was particularly acute among African Americans. 
MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 263–68. 
 141. See id. at 365–66 (observing that liberal opposition to the FAP was due in part to a 
“loathing for Nixon”). 
 142. Id. at 440–42, 446. 
 143. Notable conservative opponents included Ronald Reagan, then governor of California; 
William F. Buckley, Jr., editor of National Review; and Milton Friedman, conservative 
economist and father of the NIT. Id. at 365, 370. 
 144. Id. at 372. 
 145. This argument had two primary elements: (1) the FAP’s work incentive was insufficient 
and (2) its 50 percent phaseout provision, in concert with other various income phaseouts, was 
estimated to impose marginal tax rates as high as 80 percent on welfare-dependent (that is, 
nonworking) families, which chilled their entry into the labor market. Id. at 369–72, 411–12. 
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disappointment that the provision added to, rather than replaced, the 
patchwork of existing public-assistance programs.146 Nixon and his 
administration struggled to adequately address either side’s concerns 
due, in part, to the NIT’s relative complexity.147 Meanwhile, in the din 
of all this political maneuvering, the political parties lost sight of the 
fact that a strong majority of the public supported the FAP.148 
Facing political headwinds from both the right and left, the FAP 
sailed into a Congress in which Democrats controlled both the House 
and Senate.149 The House Committee on Ways and Means was the 
first to act, voting to approve Nixon’s FAP by a remarkable vote of 
twenty-one to three.150 Representative Wilbur D. Mills, chairman of 
the Committee, sponsored the bill151 and advocated on its behalf, 
repeating Nixon’s claim that the FAP was not a guaranteed-income 
proposal.152 The House passed the bill by a vote of 243 to 155, with 63 
percent of House Democrats and 59 percent of House Republicans153 
voting in favor.154 
The administration’s hopes were high that the Senate, widely 
considered more liberal than the House, would follow suit.155 The 
Senate Finance Committee, however, failed to report the FAP to the 
Senate floor in part due to strategic Democratic opposition156 and the 
 
Analysis later revealed that marginal tax rates could be even higher than 80 percent. See infra 
note 158 and accompanying text.  
 146. Friedman lamented that the FAP as an additional public-assistance program was “a 
striking example of how to spoil a good idea.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 370. The NIT as he 
conceived it would have replaced rather than added to the existing welfare scheme. See supra 
notes 94–95 and accompanying text. 
 147. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 115, 139–40, 215–16. 
 148. Id. at 268–69. 
 149. Id. at 418, 439; see also U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, NINETY-FIRST CONGRESS 
CONGRESSIONAL PICTORIAL DIRECTORY 181 (1969) (showing that Democrats held a majority, 
holding fifty-seven seats, in the U.S. Senate during the 91st Congress). 
 150. The three dissenting votes were Democrats who opposed the working poor being 
“added to the welfare rolls” and the prioritization of cash payments over work incentives. H.R. 
REP. NO. 91-904, at 84 (1970). 
 151. Family Assistance Act of 1970, H.R. 16311, 91st Cong. (1970). 
 152. MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 431. 
 153. George H.W. Bush, a congressman from Texas at the time, was one of only three Texas 
congressmen and the sole Republican from that state to vote in favor of the bill. Id. at 438. 
 154. Id. at 437–38. 
 155. Id. at 439, 441. 
 156. See id. at 446–52 (discussing multiple strategies).  
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regional makeup of the Committee,157 but principally because of 
revelations about unintended work disincentives of high marginal tax 
rates implicated by the FAP and its interaction with other social-
welfare programs.158 Though Nixon’s administration scrambled to 
revise the FAP and renew the fight,159 it never fully overcame 
concerns about work disincentives.160 The revised bill was defeated in 
the Finance Committee by a vote of ten to four, with seven of the 
Committee’s ten Democrats voting against it.161 
3. President Gerald Ford’s Income Supplement Program.  Nixon 
failed to enact his NIT, but the administration of his successor, 
President Gerald Ford, did not give up on the idea. In 1974, the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare under Ford 
introduced the Income Supplement Program (ISP),162 which would 
have implemented an NIT to replace Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), Food Stamps, and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI).163 Under the ISP, an individual164 or family would receive an 
NIT payment in an amount “equal to one-half of the difference 
between its actual income level and its breakeven income level.”165 
 
 157. Committee Democrats hailed primarily from Southern states where the FAP was 
particularly unpopular, and committee Republicans came from “Western states where welfare 
was a minimal problem, and reform a marginal concern.” Id. at 455. 
 158. Id. at 474–81. Programs like Medicaid and public housing had income thresholds such 
that an individual’s benefits were cut off completely if she earned more than the threshold 
amount. Thus, earning a single additional dollar of income might cause an individual to lose 
thousands of dollars in public-assistance benefits. Republican Senator John J. Williams showed 
that these “notch effects,” in concert with state and federal taxes, Social Security taxes, and the 
FAP phaseout could impose effective marginal tax rates above 100 percent. Id. at 474, 480. In 
other words, under some (atypical) scenarios involving the FAP, individuals would be better off 
financially “sit[ting] in a rocking chair” than working to earn additional income. Id. at 481. 
 159. Id. at 483–98. 
 160. Id. at 534–35. 
 161. Id. at 535. 
 162. OFFICE OF INCOME SEC. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, 
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS PAPER NO. 11, INCOME SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM: 1974 HEW WELFARE 
REPLACEMENT PROPOSAL 7 (1976). 
 163. See id. at 8, 11 (“AFDC, SSI and Food Stamps could be absorbed into a more efficient, 
consolidated negative income tax.”). 
 164. Unlike Nixon’s FAP, the ISP provided benefits to both single adults and childless 
couples. BRIAN STEENSLAND, THE FAILED WELFARE REVOLUTION: AMERICA’S STRUGGLE 
OVER GUARANTEED INCOME POLICY 179 (2008). 
 165. OFFICE OF INCOME SEC. POLICY, supra note 162, at A-2. The ISP’s “breakeven income 
level” was equal to a family’s standard deduction plus its personal exemptions. Id. “[T]ogether, 
the standard deduction and personal exemptions ensure that taxpayers are not taxed on an 
amount of income roughly equal to the official poverty level, as adjusted for family size.” 
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Figure 5166 below provides a sample illustration for a family of four. In 
effect, the ISP would have provided a guaranteed income of $3600 for 
a family of four.167 Ford never fully embraced the proposal,168 and 
Congress rejected it before it ever gained much momentum.169 
B. The EITC’s Enactment 
Though his administration’s NIT proposal failed, President Ford 
would end up signing into law the first federal NIT,170 the “Earned 
 
SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra note 19, at 11. Thus, the ISP’s “breakeven point” was useful 
for two reasons: (1) it provided a reasonable cutoff point for NIT payments (NIT recipients 
would not receive payments beyond the family size–adjusted poverty level), and (2) it avoided 
the inefficiency of requiring a family to pay taxes to Treasury on the one hand while receiving 
NIT payments from Treasury on the other. 
 166. The author created Figure 5 based on information contained in OFFICE OF INCOME 
SEC. POLICY, supra note 162, at E-1 to E-2.  
 167. See id. (“A family of four with no other income would receive an annual benefit of 
$3,600.”). 
 168. See STEENSLAND, supra note 164, at 179 (“Despite the fact that Ford had voted for the 
FAP twice as a member of Congress, he rejected [an NIT proposal] in favor of more 
incremental goals.”). 
 169. See Ventry, supra note 97, at 24–25 (describing reasons for the ISP’s rejection, which 
included its being too similar to FAP, redistributive, not sufficiently pro-work and pro-growth, 
and not doing enough to “alleviate the welfare problem”). 
 170. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6. 
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Figure 5. Ford Administration’s ISP, Family of Four 
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Income Credit” (EIC).171 Senate Finance Committee Chairman, 
Democrat Russell Long, was a key opponent of Nixon’s FAP.172 Even 
before the FAP’s defeat, Long had begun to push his own variation of 
an NIT,173 which provided a payment equal to 10 percent of income174 
for workers who earned $4000 or less.175 Long, who had caustically 
criticized the FAP for its work disincentives,176 designed his proposal 
to mitigate work disincentives by phasing out payments at a rate of 25 
percent instead of 50 percent,177 and to provide payments only to the 
working poor.178 Long’s proposal was defeated in 1972, but, through 
his continuing efforts, it remained visible in the policy discussion.179 
When President Ford called for $16 billion in tax cuts in his 1975 
State of the Union address,180 Long seized the opportunity to renew 
the fight for his proposal, which by that time he had renamed the 
“Earned Income Credit.”181 Long got his EIC into the Tax Reduction 
 
 171. Although the credit was originally dubbed the “Earned Income Credit,” it is commonly 
known today as the “Earned Income Tax Credit.” See IRS, supra note 22 (using the terms 
“EITC” and “EIC” interchangeably, but listing “EITC” first). This Note uses the term “Earned 
Income Credit” and abbreviation “EIC” only when referring to the credit in its earliest 
postenactment stages. 
 172. Long, motivated by his “implacable hostility” toward the FAP vocally opposed the 
proposal as “a guaranteed wage for not working,” offered an alternative proposal, and 
strategically delayed action on the bill long enough to enable special interest groups to organize 
lobbying efforts against it. BURKE & BURKE, supra note 86, at 177, 183–85. 
 173. Long was careful not to refer to his proposal as an NIT or guaranteed income, instead 
characterizing it as a “tax cut,” “work subsidy,” “tax refund,” “tax credit,” and “work bonus.” 
118 CONG. REC. 33,010, 33,013 (1972) (statement of Sen. Russell Long). 
 174. This 10 percent payment was intended to “refund” the amount of Social Security taxes 
paid by low-income workers and most of such taxes paid by employers on their behalf. Id. at 
33,010, 33,013. Framed as a Social Security tax refund, the amount of the payment had no 
connection to family size. Id. at 33,013. 
 175. Id. at 33,010. 
 176. Long once condemned Nixon’s FAP as enabling “people who lay about all day making 
love and producing illegitimate babies.” MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 523. 
 177. Compare 118 CONG. REC. at 33,010 (statement of Sen. Russell Long) (explaining that 
payments under Long’s proposal would be phased out at a rate of 25 percent for income over 
$4000), with supra note 121 and accompanying text (demonstrating the 50 percent phaseout of 
Nixon’s NIT proposal); supra Figures 3–4 (same). 
 178. Compare 118 CONG. REC. 33,010 (statement of Sen. Russell Long) (“[T]he benefits are 
entirely work related.”), with supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining how 
employable nonworking individuals and their families could still receive Nixon’s NIT). 
 179. Ventry, supra note 97, at 23. 
 180. Gerald R. Ford, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 15, 1975), 
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/750028.htm [http://perma.cc/H479-AZR6]. 
 181. 121 CONG. REC. 7230 (1975) (statement of Sen. Russell Long). Long had also changed 
his proposal slightly, targeting the credit to those with dependents and reducing his suggested 
phaseout rate to 10 percent. Id. 
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Act of 1975’s final version,182 which President Ford signed into law on 
March 29, 1975.183 Though the EIC might have been characterized as 
an NIT184 or structured as welfare reform or guaranteed income, the 
concept that originated as Friedman’s NIT proposal finally achieved 
political success as a new kind185 of tax credit and a relatively small 
provision186 in a familiar-seeming tax-reduction bill. Figure 6 
illustrates how the EIC compares in size and structure to the modern-
day EITC.187 
 
 
 
 
 
 182. H.R. REP. NO. 94-120, at 58–59 (1975). 
 183. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 184. Apparently, only opponents of the EIC characterized it as an NIT. See, e.g., H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-19, at 101 (1975) (“[T]o inaugurate [a negative income tax] in an emergency tax cut bill is 
silly.”); id. at 95 (“[T]he ‘earned income’ credit . . . introduces a ‘negative income tax’ to the tax 
code and includes in a so-called ‘tax cut’ many who now pay no taxes. This is neither the time 
nor the place for such a provision.”); id. at 89 (“To the extent that [the EIC] is available to 
persons who have no tax liability, it amounts to a negative income tax.”). 
 185. The EIC was the first refundable tax credit enacted at the federal level. CONG. 
BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, at 6. 
 186. That the EIC was modest in cost ($3.59 billion in 2015 dollars) “reflected the prevailing 
welfare reform consensus” that public resources could be used to reduce welfare dependency 
but not poverty. Ventry, supra note 97, at 25. 
 187. The author created Figure 6 based on information contained in Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 
2014-47 I.R.B. 863, and the Tax Reduction Act of 1975. 
Figure 6. Comparison Between 2015 EITC and 1975 EIC, Family of 
Four 
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C. Expansion 
Since the EIC—which is now popularly known as the EITC188—
was enacted during the Ford administration, every U.S. president has 
signed into law an EITC expansion. 
1. President Jimmy Carter.  President Jimmy Carter initially tried 
to expand the EITC as part of a larger welfare-reform proposal. In 
1977, President Carter announced that “continu[ing]” the EITC—
which was scheduled to expire at the end of that year189—“to help the 
working poor” would be one of twelve policy goals he hoped his 
welfare-reform proposal would achieve.190 In fact, Carter’s Program 
for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) went beyond merely continuing 
the EITC.191 Instead, it proposed to expand the credit to provide 
benefits “almost up to the median income level.”192 Some members of 
Carter’s administration, however, were disappointed that the 
proposed expansion extended some benefits to middle-income 
families rather than targeting low-income households exclusively.193 
The latter approach would have better enabled Carter to achieve his 
“desired distribution of benefits” without a corresponding “rapid 
expansion of the welfare caseload.”194 Echoing the demise of Nixon’s 
FAP,195 the PBJI was met by hostility from both conservatives and 
liberals, and Carter ultimately dropped it from his agenda in 1978.196 
 
 188. See supra note 171. 
 189. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (amending the EITC to expire at the end of 1977). 
 190. Jimmy Carter, President of the U.S., Welfare Reform Remarks at a News Briefing on 
Goals and Guidelines (May 2, 1977), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7434 [http://
perma.cc/2KX6-V2VX]. 
 191. Under Carter’s PBJI, the EITC would have added an additional 5 percent credit on top 
of the existing credit that would have kicked in when a family surpassed $4000 in earnings and 
phased out starting at about $9000 in earnings. JOINT ECON. COMM., THE PROGRAM FOR 
BETTER JOBS AND INCOME—A GUIDE AND A CRITIQUE 10 (1977). The precise point at which 
phase out would begin depended on family size. Id. 
 192. Id. at 11. 
 193. Ventry, supra note 97, at 30.  
 194. Id. at 28. In addition to reducing welfare dependence, the EITC promised a number of 
other policy benefits: administrative simplicity, improved work incentives, and reduced 
beneficiary stigma relative to means-tested welfare. Id. at 28–29. One of the EITC’s benefits was 
purely political—it appeared less costly because some of it could be scored in the budget as a 
loss of tax revenue rather than a cash outlay. Id. at 29–30. 
 195. See supra notes 136–46 and accompanying text. 
 196. Ventry, supra note 97, at 30. 
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Its association with the unpopular PBJI, however, did not taint 
the EITC. In fact, the EITC had become immensely popular.197 In the 
same year the PBJI was defeated, Congress expanded the EITC’s 
income thresholds slightly and ensconced the credit as a permanent 
fixture of the U.S. tax code.198 
2. President Ronald Reagan.  Six years after the EITC was made 
permanent, President Ronald Reagan oversaw a modest expansion. 
Years before, when he was governor of California, Reagan had been 
a vocal opponent of President Nixon’s FAP.199 He rejected the notion 
that the government should provide a minimum income, believed that 
the FAP was too expensive, and felt that it would exacerbate welfare 
dependency rather than alleviate it.200 As president, Reagan acted on 
these conservative sensibilities by cutting social-welfare spending.201 
Reagan’s aversion toward Nixon’s FAP—an EITC ancestor—and his 
penchant for cutting welfare spending, however, did not sour his 
attitude toward the EITC. In fact, Reagan signed into law a modest 
EITC expansion toward the end of his first presidential term.202 
 
 197. See LAURENCE E. LYNN, JR. & DAVID DEF. WHITMAN, THE PRESIDENT AS 
POLICYMAKER: JIMMY CARTER AND WELFARE REFORM 247 (1981) (observing that by the late 
1970s, the EITC had developed into “[e]verybody’s favorite” program). 
 198. Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 199. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 87, at 365 (recalling Reagan’s participation in a televised 
debate in which he sided against the FAP). 
 200. Steven Hayward, Editorial, Welfare Reform: Another Win for the Gipper, ASHBROOK 
CTR. AT ASHLAND U. (Dec. 1999), http://ashbrook.org/publications/oped-hayward-99-gipper 
[http://perma.cc/VCR7-FWWT]. Interestingly, Reagan testified before the Senate Finance 
Committee regarding his opposition to the FAP and proposed refunding low-income workers’ 
Social Security taxes as a policy alternative. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 68. Committee 
Chairman Russell Long was in attendance for Reagan’s testimony and, several months later, 
introduced his strikingly similar work-bonus proposal, which would later be modified and 
enacted as the EITC. Id. at 68–69. Based on this circumstantial evidence, some conservatives 
credit Reagan as the true inventor of the EITC. Id. at 67–68.  
 201. See Ventry, supra note 97, at 31 (noting that the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation 
Act of 1981, passed under President Reagan, cut $4 billion in federal and state welfare 
expenditures and removed more than four hundred thousand families from the welfare rolls); 
see also Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over Again and the 
Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 213, 220–21 (1996) 
(describing how Reagan campaigned on and fought for welfare cuts; Congress enacted his 
proposals with little resistance). 
 202. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which Reagan signed into law on July 18, 1984, 
increased the EITC’s maximum benefit from $500 to $550. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-369, § 1042, 98 Stat. 494, 1043–44 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
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During his next term, Reagan presided over a more significant 
EITC expansion as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.203 In January 
1984, Reagan announced his intentions to comprehensively reform 
the tax code and delegated to his Treasury Secretary the task of 
developing a proposal.204 Shortly after Reagan’s November 1984 
reelection, his Treasury Department released a report, nicknamed 
“Treasury I,”205 that called for the EITC to be expanded and indexed 
for inflation.206 The Treasury Department advocated EITC expansion, 
along with two other proposals,207 in order to (1) eliminate nearly all 
families with incomes below the poverty line from the income-tax 
rolls208 and (2) ensure that its tax-reform proposal approached 
distributional neutrality overall.209 President Reagan altered many of 
Treasury I’s details before releasing his official proposal (“Treasury 
II”),210 but he kept intact the EITC’s expansion and indexation.211 
Some Republicans lamented that EITC indexation and similar 
proposals in Reagan’s tax-reform plan, paid for with corporate tax 
increases, amounted to a windfall for “low-income Democrats at 
enormous expense to core Republican constituencies.”212 But such 
 
 203. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107–08 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 204. See Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., State of the Union (Jan. 25, 1984), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40205 [http://perma.cc/UF6Y-RCKK] (“I am asking 
[Treasury] Secretary Don Regan for a plan for action to simplify the entire tax code.”). 
 205. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN, MARGARET T. WRIGHTSON & DAVID R. BEAM, TAXING 
CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF TAX REFORM 46 (1990). 
 206. The Treasury Department proposed indexing the EITC’s maximum benefit and its 
phaseout thresholds. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 37, 71 
(1984). 
 207. The other two proposals were (1) increasing the personal exemption by nearly 100 
percent and (2) increasing the standard deduction. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 62. 
 208. Id. President Nixon was successful in eliminating impoverished families from the 
income-tax rolls in 1969. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. But inflation in the 
1970s gradually unraveled Nixon’s efforts by driving low-income taxpayers into higher tax 
brackets. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 62. 
 209. See CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 64 (explaining that achieving distributional 
neutrality—that is, reforming the tax code so that no income class, with the exception of the 
working poor, would bear a larger or smaller share of the overall tax burden than before—was 
one of the Treasury Department’s ground rules for tax reform). Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress agreed with the Treasury Department that tax reform should achieve distributional 
neutrality. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 148. 
 210. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 74. 
 211. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS 
FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 18 (1985). 
 212. CONLAN ET AL., supra note 205, at 87. 
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protests did not deter Reagan, who coveted tax reform’s potential 
benefits,213 and, by 1985, made tax reform his top domestic priority.214 
Treasury II underwent changes in the Democrat-controlled House,215 
the Republican-controlled Senate,216 and in conference between the 
two.217 But Reagan’s EITC proposal survived and grew,218 and when 
he signed into law the Tax Reform Act of 1986,219 he touted the bill as 
“the best antipoverty bill [and] the best profamily measure . . . to ever 
come out of the Congress of the United States.”220 
3. President George H.W. Bush.  President Reagan’s Vice 
President and successor, President George H.W. Bush, further 
expanded the EITC and amended it to be more generous to families 
with children. When then–Vice President Bush ran for president in 
1988, family issues were high on the priority list of both political 
parties.221 For his part, Bush campaigned on helping families by 
creating targeted tax credits.222 In his first year as president, Bush set 
out to fulfill his promise by proposing a new refundable tax credit to 
provide financial support to working parents of young children, the 
design of which closely resembled the EITC.223 In 1990, President 
Bush’s Supplemental Young Child Credit (SYCC) was added to the 
EITC as a 5 percent bonus credit for families with children under the 
 
 213. Reagan saw tax reform as an opportunity to lower tax rates, increase long-term support 
for the Republican Party, and cement his domestic-policy legacy. Id. at 47, 70–71. 
 214. Id. at 94. 
 215. Id. at 116–28. 
 216. Id. at 163–66, 174–76, 178–79, 181–86. 
 217. Id. at 218–21. 
 218. See HOWARD, supra note 40, at 148–49 (explaining that EITC expansion—a proposal 
that never faced significant opposition—helped tax-reform legislators achieve overall 
distributional neutrality by offsetting reform measures that benefited the wealthy). 
 219. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 220. Ronald Reagan, President of the U.S., Remarks on Signing the Tax Reform Act (Oct. 
22, 1986), http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-5678 [http://perma.cc/TKR2-TFVC]. 
 221. HOWARD, supra note 40, at 152. 
 222. Id. at 153. 
 223. Bush’s new child tax credit would have provided families with children under the age of 
four with a benefit of 14 percent of earned income up to a maximum benefit of $1000, which 
would then phase out at a rate of 20 percent for families with incomes between $8000 and 
$13,000. George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., Statement on Proposed Child-Care 
Legislation (Mar. 15, 1989), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=16789 [http://
perma.cc/Y4YW-TLJC]. 
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age of one.224 President Bush also supported amendments to the EITC 
that expanded the credit225 and—as an additional perk for families—
adjusted it to provide additional benefits to larger families for the first 
time.226 Between the beginning of Reagan’s presidency and the end of 
Bush’s, the EITC grew at an average annual rate of 11.4 percent, 
faster than any other major U.S. social program during that time.227 
4. President Bill Clinton.  Upon taking office, President Bill 
Clinton attached policy objectives of his own to the fast-moving EITC 
vehicle. First, President Clinton saw EITC expansion as a tool for 
fighting poverty. In his first speech before Congress, Clinton shared 
his vision for the EITC to become a work-premised living-wage 
guarantee for parents: “[I]f you work 40 hours a week and you’ve got 
a child in the house, you will no longer be in poverty.”228 Second, like 
Reagan before him,229 Clinton relied on the EITC to solve a budget-
politics quandary: expanding the EITC would be expensive230 and was 
therefore inconsistent with Clinton’s campaign promise to reduce the 
federal deficit.231 At the same time, Clinton’s proposed energy tax—
designed to offset EITC costs and reduce the deficit—was criticized 
as disproportionately burdensome on low-income individuals.232 The 
two proposals were therefore perfect complements in a clever 
 
 224. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11,111, 104 Stat. 
1388, 1388-408 to -413 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)). President Clinton’s 
administration presided over the SYCC’s elimination in 1993 as part of its efforts to restructure 
and expand the EITC. Michael J. Caballero, The Earned Income Tax Credit: The Poverty 
Program that Is Too Popular, 48 TAX LAW. 435, 450–52 (1995). 
 225. See George H.W. Bush, President of the U.S., Statement on Signing the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Nov. 5, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=19000 [http://perma.cc/9MX9-RZEQ] (confirming that Bush and his 
administration requested and strongly supported the expansion and creation of tax credits for 
families). 
 226. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11,111. 
 227. See HOWARD, supra note 40, at 141. 
 228. Bill Clinton, President of the U.S., Address Before a Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 
17, 1993), http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3435 [http://perma.cc/
M7TU-JZXQ]. 
 229. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 230. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D CONG., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S REVENUE PROPOSALS CONTAINED IN THE FISCAL YEAR 1994 BUDGET 3 
(1993) (estimating that President Clinton’s proposed EITC expansion would cost about $28 
billion over five years). 
 231. See Ruth Marcus & Ann Devroy, Asking Americans to ‘Face Facts,’ Clinton Presents 
Plan to Raise Taxes, Cut Deficit, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1993, at A1 (noting President Clinton’s 
campaign pledge to “halve the deficit in four years”).  
 232. Caballero, supra note 224, at 448. 
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legislative scheme—by providing additional benefits to the poor, the 
EITC expansion mitigated worries about the regressive impact of the 
energy tax while the energy tax softened concerns about swelling 
EITC costs. 
President Clinton’s ambitions to reduce poverty through the 
EITC apparently did not extend to individuals without children. His 
proposal provided the EITC to individuals who did not have a 
“qualifying dependent,”233 but only in an amount sufficient to offset 
his new energy tax, thus yielding no net antipoverty assistance.234 
President Clinton proposed a number of additional changes in 
accordance with his antipoverty policy goals. Clinton’s plan 
drastically increased the EITC’s credit rate and phase-out range in 
order to increase a family of four’s maximum credit 123 percent.235 In 
addition, Clinton proposed to make EITC benefits more responsive 
to family size, providing a 20 percent larger credit to households with 
multiple qualifying dependents than to households with only one 
qualifying dependent. 
After the EITC expansion cruised through the House and 
survived turbulence in the Senate, President Clinton signed it into law 
as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA).236 Both 
Clinton’s energy tax and his EITC expansion were approved, largely 
unaltered, by the House.237 The Senate, on the other hand, exerted far 
more resistance, effectively killing Clinton’s energy tax and slashing 
his EITC expansion by about one-third.238 Despite the fact that 
OBRA no longer included Clinton’s energy-tax proposal, the EITC 
for individuals without a qualifying dependent was included in the 
conference bill.239 That provision, as part of a compromise expansion, 
ultimately survived and was signed into law on August 10, 1993.240 
 
 233. Id. at 451. In the current EITC, the analogous term is “qualifying child,” which 
generally refers to a taxpayer’s child but can also refer to a sibling, niece, or nephew. 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(c) (2012). 
 234. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 451–52 (explaining that “[t]he credit for these 
individuals would offset the effects of the [energy] tax, and therefore was considerably smaller 
than the credit for individuals with qualifying dependents”). 
 235. Id. at 451.  
 236. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. 
 237. Caballero, supra note 224, at 454. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 456. 
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Individuals without qualifying children still receive the EITC today, 
but their credit amount is still strictly limited.241 
5. President George W. Bush.  Eleven years after the first Bush 
administration acted to expand and to supplement the EITC, 
President George W. Bush presided over a further expansion as part 
of his 2001 tax-cut legislation. Bush made large tax cuts the 
cornerstone of his 2000 presidential campaign.242 Shortly after 
assuming the presidency, he introduced a $1.6 trillion tax-cut plan243 
that proposed to, inter alia, reduce the marriage penalty244 by reviving 
an expired 10 percent deduction for two-earner couples.245 Critics 
attacked the President’s tax-cut plan because it provided greater tax 
savings to wealthy taxpayers than lower-income taxpayers.246 Thus, 
when the Republican-controlled House Ways and Means Committee 
introduced a bill247 to increase the EITC for married couples, it 
intended to accomplish two objectives: respond to President Bush’s 
call for marriage-penalty relief248 and neutralize criticism by making 
Bush’s overall proposal more progressive.249 On June 7, 2001, Bush 
signed into law the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
 
 241. See supra Figures 1–2. 
 242. Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Tax Plan: The Debate Takes Shape, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 
2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/08/26/us/the-2000-campaign-the-tax-plan-bush-tax-plan-
the-debate-takes-shape.html [https://perma.cc/7DZQ-XJWZ]. 
 243. Mona Lewandoski, The Bush Tax Cuts of 2001 and 2003: A Brief Legislative History 9 
(Harvard Law School, Budget Briefing Paper No. 37, 2008), http://www.law.harvard.edu/
faculty/hjackson/2001-2003TaxCuts_37.pdf [http://perma.cc/BPQ6-84LE]. 
 244. Married individuals suffer from a marriage penalty when they pay higher taxes under a 
joint return than they would have paid as single taxpayers. SCHMALBECK & ZELENAK, supra 
note 19, at 772. Marriage penalties are most severe “when the division of earnings between the 
spouses is relatively even.” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2002 TAX RELIEF PROPOSALS 5 (2001). 
 245. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 244, at 5. 
 246. See e.g., SHAPIRO & FRIEDMAN, supra note 23, at vii (“Under the Bush plan, after-tax 
income for the top one percent of taxpayers would grow by 6.2 percent. This is more than three 
times the income growth of 1.9 percent for the fifth of the population in the middle of the 
income spectrum.”); Bob McIntyre, CTJ Analysis of Bush Plan Updated to 2001 Levels, CTJ 
NEWS (Citizens for Tax Justice, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 27, 2001, at 1–3, http://www.ctj.org/
 pdf/gwbin01.pdf [http://www.perma.cc/DP3Y-KHXA] (noting that “more than sixty percent of 
Bush’s proposed tax cuts would go to the best-off 10 percent of Americans”). 
 247. H.R. 6, 107th Cong. (2001). 
 248. H.R. REP. NO. 107-29, at 11 (2001). 
 249. Critics, however, were not placated. See id. at 34 (“[T]he [EITC-related] improvements 
made by the Chairman to the Bush proposals do little to change the overall unfairness of the 
Republican tax plan.”). 
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Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),250 which included the House’s proposal to 
expand the EITC for married taxpayers.251 
6. President Barack Obama.  President Barack Obama followed 
in the tradition of his predecessors by enacting family-oriented EITC 
expansions. As a presidential candidate, Obama promised to 
“increase [EITC] benefits for families with three or more children, 
and reduce the EITC marriage penalty.”252 Within thirty days of 
becoming president, Obama delivered on those promises by signing 
into law EITC expansions as part of the $789 billion post-financial-
crisis economic stimulus measure,253 the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).254 President Obama signed those 
EITC expansions into law as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment 
Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010255 and again 
as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012.256 
IV.  THE EITC’S PATH-DEPENDENT PAST 
This Part examines the legislative history detailed in Part III 
through the theoretical lens of path dependence. Specifically, it 
identifies increasing-return factors that have helped carry the EITC 
forward with its basic, original structure intact257: large set-up costs, 
 
 250. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 
Stat. 38 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 251. Specifically, EGTRRA increased by $3000, in $1000 periodic increments between tax 
years 2002 and 2007, the beginning and ending of the EITC phaseout. The legislation also 
provided that the new phaseout thresholds would be indexed for inflation after 2007. JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-1-03, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGISLATION ENACTED IN 
THE 107TH CONGRESS 33 (2003). 
 252. OBAMA FOR AMERICA, BARACK OBAMA’S COMPREHENSIVE TAX PLAN 2 (2008), 
http://halebobb.com/Obama/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J2F-PXB4]. 
 253. David M. Herszenhorn & Carl Hulse, House and Senate in Deal for $789 Billion 
Stimulus, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at A1. 
 254. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, div. B, tit. I, 
§ 1002, 123 Stat. 115, 312 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)) (increasing temporarily the credit 
percentage for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children and reducing the EITC 
marriage penalty). 
 255. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, tit. I, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2012)). 
 256. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, tit. I, § 103(c), 126 Stat. 
2313, 2319–20 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2012)). 
 257. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 435 (noting that the underlying structure of the EITC 
has generally remained unchanged since it was enacted). 
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collective action, policymakers’ short-term orientation, and status quo 
bias. 
A. Legislative Analogue to Large Set-Up Costs 
President Nixon’s failed efforts to enact his FAP illustrate how 
costly it can be to attempt radical policy innovation. Nixon expended 
substantial political capital for the majority of his first term and 
ultimately achieved no legislative victory.258 By extending his hand to 
political opponents with an extraordinarily progressive welfare-
reform proposal,259 Nixon alienated political allies260 and was snubbed 
by opponents anyway.261 Senator Long also experienced high 
legislative costs. Even though his EIC was much less ambitious than 
Nixon’s FAP, it still required three years of steady effort by Long, 
chairman of the powerful Senate Finance Committee, to orchestrate 
its enactment.262 
These examples show how the EITC only came into being after 
significant start-up costs, which paved the way for subsequent path 
dependence. In a production process, high start-up or fixed costs 
create an incentive to rely on previously incurred fixed costs for as 
long as feasible.263 To illustrate, imagine an old printing press in which 
letters must be painstakingly arranged by hand. A publisher would 
have an incentive to continue printing using preset printing plates for 
as long as possible, tolerating incremental textual obsolescence and 
favoring incremental changes over large ones. This concept, by 
analogy, helps explain why policymakers rationally would not 
overhaul or replace the EITC, even if some of the purposes 
underlying its original design were merely a product of historical 
anomaly or had otherwise become obsolete. 
B. Collective Action 
President Nixon’s legislative failure also illustrates how acute the 
collective-action problem can be in the context of trying to enact a 
revolutionary policy. Nixon’s groundbreaking FAP was a textbook 
 
 258. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 259. See supra notes 123–27 and accompanying text. 
 260. See supra notes 143–46 and accompanying text. 
 261. See supra notes 136–42, 156–61 and accompanying text. 
 262. See supra Part III.B. 
 263. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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public good264: he could not exclude legislators from realizing the 
political benefits of supporting it at the eleventh hour if it turned out 
to be popular. In the meantime, they could remain passive, or even 
actively oppose, the policy, thereby free riding on President Nixon’s 
substantial lobbying and campaigning efforts.265 In fact, most 
legislators—even those who should have appreciated the EITC’s 
progressive substance—did just that.266 More or less on his own, 
President Nixon was no match for the winds of political resistance.267 
In contrast, after the EITC was enacted and its popularity was 
established, it no longer exhibited the characteristics of a public good. 
For example, President Reagan did not have to lobby anyone to 
expand the EITC in 1986: Democrats wanted expansion and 
Republicans accepted it as their ticket to lower tax rates.268 The 
elevated presence of the collective-action problem in the context of 
radical policy change helps explain why the EITC has not been 
overhauled or substantially refined in its forty-year history. 
C. Policymakers’ Short-Term Orientation 
Policymakers’ short-term orientation also contributed to the 
EITC’s path-dependent development. First, Nixon provides a 
counterexample. Ex ante, it would have been irrational for him to 
attempt such risky, costly, and ambitious policy reform if he did not 
greatly value his long-term political legacy.269 But for Reagan, Clinton, 
and both Bushes, expanding the EITC was either a political gain in 
itself or the low-cost ticket to some other immediate legislative gain.270 
Trying to completely overhaul the EITC likely would have entailed 
significant political costs and yielded only marginal short-term 
benefits. This may help explain why the EITC has never been 
comprehensively reevaluated. 
 
 264. See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
 265. For examples of such efforts, see supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 135–46 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 149–61 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 209–19 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. It makes sense that when a policymaker 
sees a single piece of legislation as one that could define her political legacy, she could 
overcome any tendency to be short-term focused. 
 270. See supra Part III.C. 
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D. Status Quo Bias 
Status quo bias also played a profound role in the EITC’s 
development. One of the most striking features of the EITC’s 
legislative history is the extent to which conservative policymakers 
have supported the EITC, the tax code’s most progressive 
provision.271 One plausible explanation for this high degree of support 
over time is that initial support (actual or apparent) by former 
Republican presidents and notable conservatives has been self-
reinforcing. As the logic goes, if Friedman originated the idea and 
Reagan supported it, how could any conservative be against it?272 
Furthermore, EITC-perpetuating factors were sewn into the 
fabric of congressional lawmaking. For example, the EITC appeared 
less costly to budget estimators than it actually was because some of it 
could be scored as a loss of tax revenue rather than a cash outlay.273 
This exceptional bang for the buck almost certainly contributed to the 
EITC’s attractiveness as a policy tool and its utility in matters made 
tricky by budget politics.274 Like other factors detailed above, this and 
other manifestations of status quo bias may have helped propel the 
EITC along its original path, with all of its random bumps and 
obsolete detours. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS OF EITC PATH DEPENDENCE 
Now that specific increasing-returns factors have been identified, 
this Part presents the implications of EITC path dependence. First, it 
describes how path dependence helped cause the EITC’s 
undertheorization. Next, it concludes that this path dependence–
generated undertheorization is, all things considered, an advantage, 
not a hindrance. 
 
 271. THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD & REBECCA THIESS, ECON. POLICY INST., THE EARNED 
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND THE CHILD TAX CREDIT: HISTORY, PURPOSE, GOALS AND 
EFFECTIVENESS 2 (2013), http://s3.epi.org/files/2013/The-Earned-Income-Tax-Credit.pdf 
[http://www.perma.cc/XR7L-U8E7] (“The EITC is, by far, the most progressive tax expenditure 
in the income tax code.”). 
 272. As a contemporary example of this phenomenon, House Speaker (and former House 
Ways and Means Chairman) Paul Ryan recently proposed an EITC expansion that he touts as 
having “conservative origins.” Brian Faler, Republicans’ Love-Hate Relationship with a Tax 
Credit, POLITICO (Jan. 17, 2014, 5:04 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/republicans-
gop-earned-income-tax-credit-paul-ryan-marco-rubio-102294.html [http://www.perma.cc/W5
 GD-AJ9Y]. 
 273. See supra note 194. 
 274. See supra notes 209, 229–32 and accompanying text. 
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A. How Path Dependence Led to the EITC’s Undertheorization 
Path dependence helps explain the EITC’s undertheorization. 
Professor Zelenak bemoaned the facts that the EITC lacks “any 
coherent purpose discernible from [its] structure” and that Congress 
has never elucidated its purpose.275 He thus proposed a 
comprehensive overhaul that would give the EITC a unified and 
contemporarily relevant purpose.276 That the EITC lacks a single 
coherent purpose is a direct result of its path-dependent past. Since 
the EITC was enacted, policymakers have lacked sufficient incentive 
to enact the kind of foundational EITC modernization that Professor 
Zelenak proposed.277 Instead, changes have been incremental, 
preserving the EITC’s original structure278 while manifesting an 
assortment of different purposes.279 Some of these purposes may no 
longer be relevant and others likely contributed to political ends at 
the expense of good, coherent policy. For example, President 
Reagan’s 1986 EITC expansion was designed to preserve 
distributional neutrality as part of a larger tax-reform bill;280 President 
George H.W. Bush’s EITC expansions, which prioritized families 
with children under the age of one, arose out of an intensely 
profamily political environment;281 President Clinton’s expansion 
provided benefits to childless individuals in order to offset the effects 
of an energy tax that was never enacted, but puzzlingly excluded such 
individuals from receiving significant antipoverty benefits;282 President 
George W. Bush’s EITC expansion was currency for political quid 
pro quo and a blunt instrument for ameliorating the marriage 
penalty;283 and President Obama’s EITC expansions originated as part 
of a bill designed to stimulate the economy in the wake of the 
financial crisis.284 With these disparate purposes being incrementally 
 
 275. Zelenak, supra note 2, at 301; see also Bird-Pollan, supra note 40, at 284 (“While the 
EITC has continued to enjoy strong political support, it has also continued to suffer from an 
absence of any clearly articulated purpose.”). 
 276. See generally Zelenak, supra note 2 (proposing to redesign the EITC to function as a 
minimum-wage supplement that provides a benefit that adjusts for family size).  
 277. See supra Part IV. 
 278. See Caballero, supra note 224, at 435 (noting that the underlying structure of the EITC 
has generally remained unchanged since it was enacted). 
 279. See supra Part III. 
 280. See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra Part III.C.3. 
 282. See supra Part III.C.4. 
 283. See supra Part III.C.5. 
 284. See supra Part III.C.3–6. 
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manifest into the EITC, and with path dependence preventing 
foundational modernization, it is no wonder the EITC has evolved 
into an ambiguous jumble of a policy. 
B. Why the EITC’s Undertheorization Is an Advantage, Not a 
Hindrance 
Of course, not all of the various purposes upon which the EITC 
is built are obsolete, and the EITC remains extraordinarily useful 
despite its enigmatical structure. For example, the EITC has played a 
significant role in alleviating poverty. In the past, the income- and 
payroll-tax systems increased the number of those in poverty.285 
Today, primarily due to the EITC’s enactment and expansion, those 
systems reduce the number of people in poverty, particularly 
children.286 In 2009, for example, the EITC “lifted 6.5 million working 
families, including 3.3 million children, out of poverty.”287 Moreover, 
the EITC also helps to reduce economic inequality. Progressive tax 
systems tend to reduce inequality,288 and no tax provision contributes 
more to the federal income tax’s progressivity than the EITC.289 
Given its utility—and despite its imperfections—policymakers 
contemplating comprehensive EITC reform should proceed with 
caution. Given that its structure is a manifestation of diverse 
purposes, the EITC is a policy Rorschach test, providing both 
conservatives and liberals plenty to admire. Conservatives can 
applaud the EITC for its conservative origins;290 its status as an 
alternative to welfare;291 and the role it plays in lowering marginal tax 
rates,292 supporting families,293 and mitigating the marriage penalty.294 
Progressives, on the other hand, can admire the EITC’s extraordinary 
 
 285. David Kamin, Reducing Poverty, Not Inequality: What Changes in the Tax System Can 
Achieve, 66 TAX L. REV. 593, 633–34 (2013). 
 286. Id. 
 287. NICOLAS JOHNSON & ERICA WILLIAMS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, A 
HAND UP: HOW STATE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING FAMILIES ESCAPE 
POVERTY IN 2011, at 3 (2011), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-18-11sfp.pdf [http://www.perma.cc/
BPS9-UNJQ]. 
 288. See Leonard E. Burman, Taxes and Inequality, 66 TAX L. REV. 563, 569 (2013) 
(explaining that the progressivity of the federal tax system reduces economic inequality). 
 289. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra Part III. 
 291. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 293. See supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 243–51 and accompanying text. 
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progressivity295 and its efficacy in reducing poverty and income 
inequality.296 Though endowing the EITC with a single unified 
purpose may very well improve the EITC as a policy matter, such 
improvements must be carefully weighed against the risk of 
destroying the EITC’s politically valuable ambiguity.297 If 
policymakers convert ink blots into a more vivid picture, everyone 
might not like what they see any more. 
CONCLUSION 
The EITC is special. Path-dependence analysis typically leads to 
a diagnosis of policy problems. For example, Professors Steven L. 
Schwarcz and Ori Sharon recently used a path-dependence lens to 
diagnose inefficiencies in the treatment of derivatives transactions 
under bankruptcy law.298 Though path-dependence analysis, in this 
case, did uncover policy shortcomings,299 it also helped identify an 
unconventional strength: ambiguity that has largely neutralized 
political opposition. Theorizing the EITC—eliminating its 
ambiguity—risks endangering a member of the rarest of all policy 
species: one on which both parties can agree. 
 
 
 295. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
 296. See supra notes 285–89 and accompanying text. 
 297. For example, conservatives may not like the EITC as much if it became, as Professor 
Zelenak proposed, closely tied to the minimum wage, a policy many conservatives already 
oppose. See William Finnegan, Demonizing the Minimum Wage, THE NEW YORKER: DAILY 
COMMENT (Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/demonizing-
minimum-wage [http://www.perma.cc/CM8L-B2AH] (detailing opposition to the minimum 
wage among Republicans in Congress). 
 298. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz & Ori Sharon, The Bankruptcy-Law Safe Harbor for 
Derivatives: A Path-Dependence Analysis, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1715 (2014) (examining how 
the rights and immunities of creditors in bankruptcy actions result from path dependence and 
explaining the problems that such path dependence can cause).  
 299. See supra Part V.A. 
